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Implicit Bias in Judicial Performance Evaluations:
We Must Do Better Than This
Rebecca D. Gill
Department of Political Science, University of Nevada Las Vegas, Las Vegas, Nevada
Judicial performance evaluations (JPEs) are a critical part of selecting judges, especially in states
using merit-based selection systems. This article shows empirical evidence that gender and race bias
still exist in attorney surveys conducted in accordance with the ABA’s Guidelines. This systematic
bias is related to a more general problem with the design and implementation of JPE surveys, which
results in predictable problems with the reliability and validity of the information obtained through
these survey instruments. This analysis raises questions about the validity and reliability of the JPE.
This is a particularly poor outcome, as it means that we are subjecting many judges to state-sponsored
evaluations that are systematically biased against women and minorities.
KEYWORDS: judicial performance evaluation, implicit bias, judicial selection, judicial quality,
gender bias, race bias
INTRODUCTION
Judicial performance evaluations (JPEs) are a critical part of selecting judges, especially in states
using merit-based selection systems. These JPEs, which have been increasing in popularity in
recent years, fulfill two important functions. First, JPEs provide voters with information upon
which they rely when casting their ballot in judicial elections (Bernick and Pratto 1995; Esterling
1999; Hall 1985). Second, the evaluation of judicial performance is an important tool for protecting
the quality and accountability of judges (White 2009). Ideally, JPE programs should be “designed
and administered in a way that does not inadvertently harm the principles they are intended to
promote” (Esterling 1999, 207), especially in light of the efforts of various “good government”
interest groups to implement merit-based selection systems in states around the country (Cann
2006).
In an effort to help states pursue these goals, the American Bar Association published its
“Guidelines for the Evaluation of Judicial Performance” (American Bar Association 1985, 2005).
All of the current and model JPE systems have been informed by these Guidelines, which admon-
ish states to devise JPEs that supply judges and voters with reliable and unbiased information. A
number of “behavior-based measures” of judicial performance for use in attorney surveys have
been derived from the Guidelines. Such measures feature prominently in other model JPE systems
Address correspondence to Rebecca D. Gill. Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of
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2 R. D. GILL
(IAALS 2006a, 2006b; Puiszis 2011), as well as in all of the state-sponsored (Gill et al. 2011)
and many of the bar association-sponsored attorney surveys (e.g., Brody 2012, 2008a; Brody
and Lovrich 2009). But the behavior-based evaluation measures derived from the language of the
Guidelines have not been validated through rigorous analysis. A recent scholarly exposition of
the methods used in JPE surveys concludes that “these surveys tended to share some fundamental
design flaws that could produce low-quality data” (Elek et al. 2012, 67). Although these survey
design problems can yield all manner of troublesome biases and inconsistencies in the resulting
data, none is starker than the systematic discrepancies in survey results between judges based on
their race and gender.
Research is only now beginning to address the critical question of how to minimize gender and
race bias in the judicial evaluation process (Durham 2000). Of the twenty-two states that have
state-sponsored JPE systems in place, just one has undertaken the work of reviewing JPE surveys
for empirical evidence of systematic gender and race bias, and that study is almost twenty years
old.1 The present analysis shows empirical evidence that gender and race bias still exist in attorney
surveys conducted in accordance with the ABA’s Guidelines. This systematic bias is related to
a more general problem with the design and implementation of JPE surveys, which results in
predictable problems with the reliability and validity of the information obtained through these
survey instruments.
JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Although evaluations of judicial performance are nothing new (Feeney 1987), there are increasing
calls for reliance on JPEs. Proponents of JPE cite a number of important potential benefits.
Scholars have long recognized the voter information problem in judicial elections (Dubois 1980).
The problem is especially pronounced in retention elections (Hojnacki and Baum 1992). Voters
in judicial elections report a desire for more information about judicial candidates (Boatright and
Esterling 2000). JPEs are seen as an important way to solve the voter information problem in
judicial elections (Hall and Aspin 1987). They accomplish this by providing voters with relevant
information about the performance of their sitting judges (Brody 2008b), even in states with
competitive judicial elections (Brody 2003).
Scholars also argue that JPEs can protect the quality of the judges on the bench, in part by
encouraging self-improvement (Aynes 1981; Chauvin 1989). Indeed, many judges report that the
performance evaluation process helps them become better judges (Esterling 1999). This individual
self-improvement can result in aggregate level improvement in the administration of justice from
the entire judiciary (Feeney 1987). Even vocal critics of JPE agree that the use of such tools
confidentially for the purposes of self-improvement can be a great benefit to judges (Griffin 1994).
By subjecting judges to performance evaluations, states can reinforce the idea that judges are
not like other politicians, and this may help to increase the legitimacy of the courts more generally
(White 2009). The process can help “to remind citizens of the judges’ unique role in democratic
1A 1993 study of the results of the Colorado Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission’s lawyer survey showed
that male and female lawyers alike rated female judges consistently lower than male judges (Sterling 1993). Colorado
has since adjusted its evaluation methods, but no rigorous follow-up studies have been conducted to confirm that the
disparities have been resolved.
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IMPLICIT BIAS IN JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS 3
government” (Esterling 1999, 215). JPEs can encourage voters to think of judicial quality in terms
of the criteria outlined in the ABA Guidelines instead of evaluating judges through the prism of
policy-based outcomes (Kourlis and Singer 2007; Singer 2007). Some scholars argue that, when
given the appropriate information, voters may be inclined to view concerns about procedural
justice as relevant to their evaluation of judicial candidates (Olson 2001).
Underlying all of these justifications for JPE is the assumption that the evaluation process
can yield important determinations about the quality of the performance of individual judges
on the bench. Most observers of the courts know a high- or low-quality judge when they see
one, but it is a much more difficult task to design a rigorous instrument to define and measure
judicial quality systematically. In its 1985 publication, “Guidelines for the Evaluation of Judicial
Performance” (American Bar Association 1985; updated in 2005, collectively “the Guidelines”),
the ABA laid out a series of criteria by which observers should measure the quality of judges.
These criteria are divided into a series of categories, including the judge’s legal ability, integrity
and impartiality, communication skills, professionalism and temperament, and administrative
capacity. These categories of judicial quality are not controversial, and they are used widely as
the basis of judicial performance evaluation programs throughout the United States (Gill et al.
2011). They represent the goals we have for judicial officers operating at peak performance levels.
The Guidelines provide an important starting place, but they give little guidance when it comes
to creating operational measures of any of these broad dimensions of performance. The 2005
commentary recommends very strongly that the design of any specific measurement instruments
be left to experts, and that behavior-based instruments be used to “generate more meaningful
information about judicial behavior” (American Bar Association 2005, 13). Although most state-
sponsored JPEs feature a number of different sources of information, the survey instrument is
“clearly the key component of all JPE programs” (Brody 2000, 336). Commission members
report relying heavily on the attorney surveys in the production of commission recommendations
(Esterling and Sampson 1998). This is, in part, because “technical competence is a primary
criterion and cannot be well assessed by those without that technical competence themselves”
(Olson and Batjer 1999, 129).
RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY IN SURVEY-BASED
PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
It is difficult to obtain accurate information about job performance. Performance rating systems
“almost inevitably contain various forms of rater errors” (Borman 1978, 135). Although research
on performance appraisal has flourished, “reliability and validity still remain major problems in
most appraisal systems” (Banks and Murphy 1985, 335). JPEs come with a unique combination
of reliability and validity issues because of their unique survey structure.
Across all sectors of society in which performance appraisal is conducted, the process is
generally disliked by everyone involved. Indeed, it “seems to be tolerated only because no
one can think of any realistic, better alternatives” (Shafritz et al. 1986, 428). The process of
performance appraisal in the public sector is different from its private sector cousin (Daley 1992).
It is particularly important to be diligent about performance assessment design in the public
sector because “the business of choosing [performance] measures is the business of choosing
what government does” (Moynihan et al. 2011, 152). When we do performance appraisal badly,
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4 R. D. GILL
“we end up playing God with an employee’s career on the basis of little more than a personal
opinion” (Morrisey 1983, 4).
The literature on performance appraisal is diverse, spreading over a number of academic disci-
plines (Daley 1992). Much of the research on improving the reliability of performance appraisals
concludes that evaluator training programs can help to minimize measurement error problems
(Bernardin et al. 2012; Daley 1992; Landy and Farr 1980; Martin and Bartol 1988; Morrisey
1983). About 90 percent of job performance appraisals of public sector workers are conducted
by supervisors (Daley 1992).2 But JPEs differ from most performance appraisals in that they are
not conducted by the judge’s supervisor. The attorney survey evaluation of judicial performance
most closely resembles something between a peer review and a review by subordinates. The
lawyers and judges are not exactly peers in the workgroup setting, but they do share in common
an educational background and a practical understanding of what it takes to be a good judge.
In light of the practical impossibility of providing a broad-based rater training program for
respondent attorneys, it is particularly important for JPE designers to be attentive to the potential
for measurement error. Errors in measurement can yield data that do not reflect the underlying re-
ality that the performance appraisal tool is purporting to measure. Measurement error comes from
the interaction of deficiencies in the instrument and characteristics of the respondent (Bautista
2010). For example, response errors such as leniency error, the halo or horns effect, and central
tendency bias can all result from instruments that insufficiently define the performance standards
or response options (Bernick and Pratto 1995). The type of error that results often depends on the
particular characteristics of the evaluator (Landy and Farr 1980).
Most JPE surveys use something called a graphic rating scale, which gives a Likert-style set
of response items for a set of (mostly) behavioral patterns. JPE surveys typically use adjectival
or numerical anchors to guide raters in choosing the appropriate response. These anchors may be
arranged in the style of grades from A to F, as in Colorado’s survey. Alternatively, they can be
broad descriptions of acceptability, as in a response set of “not adequate,” “adequate,” and “more
than adequate.” In each case, the meaning of these anchors is vague, and their interpretation will
vary across raters (Daley 1992).
The ABA Guidelines (American Bar Association 2005) recommend transforming these graphic
rating scales into “behavior-based measures.” Although the Guidelines do not mention it by name,
the description of these measures is much like the behaviorally anchored rating scales (BARS)
procedure.3 Using a critical incident technique, BARS instrument designers conduct a thorough
job analysis and identify concrete examples of job-related behaviors. Then these behaviors are set
to scale using descriptive anchors that represent a continuum of possible levels of performance.
The job analysis feature of the BARS development procedure is an important bulwark against
many validity problems. Content validity is boosted through this process, which casts a wide
net for examples of important job-related behavior. The job analysis also includes an expert
determination via consensus about the weights that each individual behavior dimension should
2JPEs are one of the few instances where surveys are used for formal job performance evaluation. As such, the
sampling error problems of survey research complicate the already difficult measurement error problems inherent in
employee performance appraisal. It is beyond the scope of this article to address the survey-related problems with
unrepresentative data. For a discussion of these issues, see Elek et al. (2012) and Wood and Lazos (2009).
3Since the creation of the BARS procedure (Smith and Kendall 1963), a number of similar systems have been
developed that share a number of the same basic features. For a brief description, see Prowse and Prowse (2009). For the
purposes of this article, the term BARS will be inclusive of these progeny.
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IMPLICIT BIAS IN JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS 5
be accorded in an overall assessment of job performance. Construct validity can suffer when the
performance dimensions measured by the instrument cannot be distinguished by the evaluators.
The job analysis allows for a team of experts to identify and isolate the important constructs
that underlie expectations of the various levels of performance excellence for the job. These
improvements in content and construct validity should reveal themselves in an increased criterion
validity, whereby external, objective measures of performance should be related to the measures
on the performance appraisal instrument.
The BARS approach can also mitigate problems with measurement error. Response biases such
as leniency and central tendency error are reduced by removing from the raters the responsibility
for defining the adjectival anchors for themselves (Bernick and Pratto 1995). The BARS strategy
counteracts the halo/horns effects by defining the various dimensions precisely (Bernick and
Pratto 1995). Interrater reliability is also improved, as differences in rater definitions of the
adjectival or numeric anchors are neutralized (Bernick and Pratto 1995). In short, this strategy is
thought to improve both the validity and the reliability of the instrument.
To at least some degree, the development of the BARS technique was spurred on by the
decisions of judges in employment discrimination cases (Stryker et al. 2011). Courts, convinced
by the testimony of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, have pushed for the replacement of the more
subjective performance evaluations with objective appraisals based on behaviors or management
objectives. This is because, along with the other purported benefits of BARS systems, they are
also thought to decrease the incidence of explicit and implicit bias on the basis of race, gender,
or other immutable characteristics.
Although the ABA Guidelines (American Bar Association 2005) recommend the use of
behaviorally anchored response scales, this suggestion has not been followed in practice. The
JPE attorney surveys that have been derived from the ABA Guidelines almost universally purport
to use “behavior-based measures” to assess judicial performance (Brody 2008a, 2012; Brody
and Lovrich 2009; IAALS 2006a, 2006b). These measures, however, are not BARS; they lack
the particular job analysis and behavioral anchoring that are at the core of the BARS evaluation
instrument (Daley 1992).
A recent analysis of eighteen currently used JPEs and four model JPE systems shows that
the survey instruments suffer from widespread problems; many of these instruments confound
multiple aspects of judicial behavior, ask questions using imprecise language, and provide little
helpful anchoring information in the response categories (Elek et al. 2012). Each of these failures
can contribute to measurement error by forcing evaluators to make judgment calls about the
meaning of the question prompt, the kind of evidence that supports a high or low rating on that
question prompt, and the appropriate response category that represents a particular rating.
In this situation, the instrument fails to give the evaluator enough information to make a
judgment. The evaluator supplements the instrument using information that is less relevant—and
perhaps inappropriate—to the task at hand. This is how respondent characteristics work together
with the inadequate instrument to create measurement error. And, in many instruments, the
measurement error reflects the implicit biases of the evaluator.
IMPLICIT BIAS IN JPE
Traditionally, gender and race discrimination have been understood as products of conscious
motive or intent (Krieger 1995). More recently, scholars have recognized the important impact
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6 R. D. GILL
of unconscious or implicit bias on the perception of performance in gender and race-stereotyped
jobs (Gill et al. 2011). Male legal professionals tend to perceive much less gender bias in the
workplace than do their female colleagues (Coontz 1995). Even in the context of the popularity of
diversity initiatives in law schools, race-based stereotypes of law students have a disproportionally
negative effect on minority students (Clydesdale 2004). Indeed, achievement levels for minority
lawyers still lag, even in the face of economic incentives for law firms to increase racial diversity
(Gordon 2003).
Social science research, especially in the field of cognitive psychology, has identified a more
innocent but pernicious cause of gender and race discrimination: implicit bias. The process of
simplifying and categorizing our environment, which exists as a necessary condition for most
higher-level cognitive function, processes people just as it does letters, shapes, and colors (Lee
2005). Even absent a conscious bias against women or minorities, everyone is exposed to the
societal stereotypes associated with different categories of people. It is through the lens of these
stereotypes that we perceive, process, store, recall, and synthesize information about people.
Our actions may be based, in part, on the accumulated stereotypes about a particular outgroup,
resulting in inaccuracy and unfairness based on race or gender.
The social science evidence for implicit race and gender bias in employment decisions is
strong and convincing. In fact, this theory of decision making played a pivotal role in the
Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (1989) [490 U.S. 228], which held
that gender stereotypes had been used to deny a female accountant’s bid for partner (Fiske et al.
1991). Social cognition theory explains that humans are naturally programmed to apply cognitive
schemas to aspects of our interpersonal relationships. Just as we use situational stereotypes as
shortcuts to understanding our physical world, we also develop them to organize our interpersonal
interactions.
This works nicely when we are aware of what we are doing and when we can control the
content and activation of these schemas. But implicit social cognition theory holds that this is not
usually the case; instead, we are gathering information and categorizing people at a subconscious
or unconscious level. Implicit cognition is “the process through which we become sensitive
to certain regularities in the environment (1) in the absence of intention to learn about those
regularities, (2) in the absence of the awareness that one is learning, and (3) in such a way that
the resulting knowledge is difficult to express” (Cleeremans 2003, 491). Implicit social cognition
is the application of this cognitive process to information about groups of people.
This is what gives rise to implicit bias. This kind of bias happens much more furtively than
bias based on explicit racism or sexism. People who self-report low levels of racial or gender
bias can still exhibit implicit bias driven by underlying stereotype schemas (Lee 2005). This does
not mean that self-reported measures of sexism and racism are disingenuous; instead, people are
“unable to know the contents of their mind” (Kang and Banaji 2006, 1071), and the stereotypes
creep in to frame evaluations of others without our conscious consent.
A few aspects of implicit social cognition theory are particularly relevant to JPEs. First,
higher rates of bias tend to occur in hiring-related decisions where the characteristics that are
stereotypical for the job are at odds with the gender or race stereotype (Heilman 1983; Landy
and Farr 1980). This kind of stereotype can survive repeated exposure to individual judges whose
behavior and performance does not seem to conform to the underlying race or gender stereotypes
of the profession (Carnes et al. 2005). This often results in a paradox or “double bind” for women
in the legal profession because they continue to be penalized in their performance evaluations
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IMPLICIT BIAS IN JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS 7
both for being too masculine and for not fitting the masculine stereotype of the job (Bowman
1998).
A second important characteristic of implicit bias is the fact that subjective, vague, or abstract
evaluation criteria exacerbate discriminatory employment decisions (Fiske et al. 1991). In other
words, more traditional reliability and validity deficiencies in performance appraisal instrument
design leaves more room for implicit biases to drive the results. In JPEs, “[t]he force of traditional
stereotypes is compounded by the subjectivity of performance evaluations” (Rhode 2001, 15).
Previous research finds that the yes-or-no question, “Should Judge X be retained?” can have
this effect (Gill et al. 2011). The work of judges and other legal professionals is often based at
least partially on subjective assessments, “relying on the judgments of supervisors and colleagues
regarding the less measurable activities” (Choi et al. 2009, 1319).
Other characteristics of the evaluation environment can exacerbate implicit race and gender
bias. Anonymous performance ratings tend to have more variance (Landy and Farr 1980). Evi-
dence suggests that the anonymity of evaluations increases the effects of implicit bias (Hekman
et al. 2010), such that implicit bias may be the source of the larger variance. Evaluations that
are done quickly are also more subject to this kind of bias (Carnes et al. 2005). Evaluations
of performance after the fact can also encourage bias, as the evaluator is required to access
stored memories in order to make an assessment. Information that is inconsistent with existing
unconscious stereotypes is more difficult for the brain to store, but supporting evidence may be
magnified in the memory, and even embellished or fabricated unknowingly (Bartlett 1932).
All of these conditions hold in attorney surveys of judicial performance. Judging, like
the practice of law more generally, is a male-stereotyped activity. The types of questions asked
are generally behavioral in nature, but the instruments often suffer from design defects that make
it difficult for respondents to formulate objective assessments. These surveys are often done
quickly, as attorneys are asked to rate several judges at a time on their performance over the past
two years. The resulting assessments are anonymous. In all, surveys of judicial performance may
be even more likely than other performance evaluations to suffer from unconscious gender and
race bias.
The Guidelines (American Bar Association 2005) suggest the use of behavior-based measures
in part to combat the effects measurement error in judicial performance evaluations. The Guide-
lines also note that, in correcting these measurement error problems, implicit bias in judicial
performance evaluations will be mitigated. The Guidelines predict that using behavior-based
measures will “reduce subjectivity in assessments of judicial performance, thus limiting the po-
tential for gender and other biases to influence responses” (American Bar Association 2005, 14).
But the JPE survey instruments derived from the Guidelines have failed to incorporate some of
the most important features of the BARS procedure (Elek et al. 2012; Bernick and Pratto 1995),
and there is reason to suspect that these surveys have not achieved the error and bias reductions
that the ABA envisioned.
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF JPE ATTORNEY SURVEY DATA
The problems of measurement error outlined above are systematically linked to implicit bias.
Where the survey instrument provides too little guidance for respondents, measurement error
is the result. Part of this measurement error is the gender and race bias that results from the
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8 R. D. GILL
unconscious activation of stereotypes anticipated by implicit bias theory. On its face, the typical
JPE survey instrument has the markers for the kind of measurement error that comes from poorly
designed performance measures (Elek et al. 2012). In addition, there is evidence that the job of
the judge carries with it a strong and pervasive set of race and gender stereotypes. Indeed, a slew
of committees and task forces “have found that bias was prevalent in the experiences of female
and minority litigants, court employees, and attorneys” (Knowlton and Reddick 2012, 28).
The presence of race and gender bias in JPE attorney survey results, then, is an indicator
of broader problems with the performance evaluation instrument. Bias is likely in performance
evaluations that lack “an easily accessible check list of objective cues for the evaluation of
performance” (Wheery and Bartlett 1982, 534). Given the particular potential for implicit race
and gender bias in the legal profession, the bias associated with poorly designed appraisal
measures is likely to manifest, at least in part, as gender and race bias.
To get a clear sense of the extent of the problem, then, a multipronged analytical strategy
is required. Ideally, individual attorney responses on performance evaluation questionnaires,
accompanied by important demographic and other contextual information about the attorney
respondents, would be analyzed. This type of data would allow for an investigation of a number
of indicators of validity, reliability, and the nature of any race or gender gap in the resulting
performance evaluation ratings.
At present, this is not practical. Although the Guidelines (American Bar Association 2005)
and other model codes (IAALS 2006a, 2006b) stress the importance of wide dissemination of
survey results, the recommended dissemination format includes only performance data aggregated
by judge. This, of course, is out of concern for “ensur[ing] the anonymity of respondents to
performance questionnaires” (American Bar Association 2005, 14). Some JPE commissions
provide summary demographic information about the respondents, but none provides access to
even redacted versions of the respondent-level data.
Even still, some important information relevant to the issues of implicit bias can be gained
from close analysis of aggregate JPE survey data. Evidence of persistent differences in scores
on the basis of race or sex that are not mitigated by the inclusion of objective information about
judicial performance is consistent with the hypothesis that implicit bias is present in the survey
results. It is likely that certain questions in the evaluation process trigger different gendered and
raced understandings of what it means to perform that trait well. There is evidence that judicial
temperament and legal knowledge survey questions introduce systematic implicit gender bias
(Durham 2000).
Evidence that implicit bias occurs in tandem with other problems with validity and reliability
adds credence to the idea that the gender and race bias is a symptom of broader problems with the
JPE attorney surveys as currently implemented. Although it is not possible to identify the exact
cause of any reliability or validity issues in aggregate data, many of these problems will manifest
themselves in particular patterns at the aggregate level. For example, high average scores across
all performance dimensions suggest a problem with the halo effect. A high correlation among
aggregate scores on all of the different performance dimensions suggests an inability of the
dimensions to isolate various important performance factors. If the interdimensional correlations
are not significantly lower than the intradimensional correlations, this also suggests a problem
with construct validity.
The attorney survey data in this analysis come from the Las Vegas Review-Journal’s “Judging
the Judges” survey. This survey of practicing attorneys is conducted every even year in conjunction
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IMPLICIT BIAS IN JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS 9
with the judicial election cycle. Although this particular survey is not part of a comprehensive
state- or bar-sponsored JPE program, the survey was created by joint committee of experts
(Hopkins 2012) and is very similar in design and implementation to existing state-sponsored
attorney surveys (Gill et al. 2011).
The survey asks respondent attorneys to rate the performance of all the judges on the Clark
County ballot before whom they have argued a case in the evaluation period. The resulting data
are aggregated by judge for each year, yielding 350 average scores across 94 judges.4 This is
an unbalanced panel dataset, as not all judges served on the bench across the entire twelve-year
survey period. The survey uses a set of twelve questions5 to assess the five main performance
dimensions suggested in Section V of the ABA Guidelines (see Table 1). These categories are
Legal Ability (LA), Integrity and Impartiality (II), Communication Skills (CS), Professionalism
and Temperament (PT), and Administrative Capacity (AC).
From the start, many of the problems identified by Elek, Rottman, and Cutler (2012) are
present in the Judging the Judges survey. Take, for example, Question 11 from the 2002–2008
version of the survey. The question prompt is as follows:
The judge is punctual in convening court, keeps business moving, and does an amount of work fair
to taxpayers and to other judges.
While many of the questions are double-barreled items, this is triple-barreled. This is problematic,
as it forces the respondent to make judgments about which component of the question deserves
the most weight. How should an attorney rate a judge who appears to work very hard, but who
also was late to court? The question prompt does not provide any guidance, and attorneys will
be left to their own sense of which component should weigh most heavily in their evaluation.
Abstract and vague language is pervasive in this question as well. The attorneys are left to figure
out for themselves what it means to “keep business moving.”
The rating scale is also problematic. Attorney respondents are asked to rate judge performance
on each dimension as “more than adequate,” “adequate,” or “not adequate.” This scale requires
each respondent attorney to concoct an individual assessment of what kind of behavior qualifies
as “adequate.” In addition, it makes little sense to answer the Question 11 decision prompt with
the phrase “not adequate.” The rating scale is incongruous with the question prompt.
Elek, Rottman, and Cutler (2012) argue that these problems compromise the validity, reliability,
and perceived fairness of the JPE process. Indeed, there are some warning signs in the aggregate
respondent data. The inter-dimensional correlation matrix (see Table 2) shows a high alpha score
and high bivariate correlations between all of the five dimensions of judicial performance. Three
of the dimensions are measured by two or more questions on the survey; these intra-dimensional
correlation matrices can be found in Table 3. These correlations and alpha scores are only slightly
4The administrative performance scores are measured for only 87 judges, yielding only 311 observations; the Judging
the Judges survey does not collect this information for Nevada Supreme Court Justices.
5The precise wording and organization of the questions has changed slightly over time. The years column in Table 1
indicates which years the Judging the Judges survey used each of the questions. The Q (Question) column indicates which
historical and question formulations make up the scores for each of the questions contained in the analysis. For example,
the judge-level scores on Question 1 in the analysis are the average of two questions in the 1998–2000 data, but they are
the results of a single question in the 2002–2008 data.
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10 R. D. GILL
TABLE 1
Questions on the LVRJ Judging the Judges Survey Instrument, 1998–2008
Q Years Category Survey Question Text
1 98–00 Integrity & Impartiality The judge fairly and impartially weighs all the evidence and
arguments of counsel before rendering a decision.
Integrity & Impartiality The judge demonstrates familiarity with the pleadings, record,
memoranda, and/or briefs.
02–08 Integrity & Impartiality The judge demonstrates familiarity with the case record and
documents, and fairly weighs all evidence and arguments
before rendering a decision.
2 98–00 Legal Ability The judge’s rulings regarding criminal sentencing and
contempt are appropriate.
02–08 Legal Ability The judge’s rulings, whether regarding civil issues, criminal
sentencing, or contempt, are appropriate.
3 98–00 Legal Ability The judge properly applies the rules of procedure and evidence
Legal Ability The judge properly applies the law.
02–08 Legal Ability The judge properly applies the law, rules of procedure, and
rules of evidence.
4 98–08 Communication Skills The judge clearly explains the basis for his or her decisions.
5 98–08 Integrity & Impartiality The judge’s professional behavior is free from impropriety or
the appearance of impropriety.
6 98–08 Integrity & Impartiality The judge’s conduct is free from bias on the basis of race or
ethnic origin.
7 98–08 Integrity & Impartiality The judge’s conduct is free from bias on the basis of gender.
8 98–08 Integrity & Impartiality The judge’s conduct is free from bias on the basis of religion.
9 98–08 Integrity & Impartiality The judge’s conduct is free from bias on the basis of parties or
attorneys involved in the action.
10 98–08 Administrative Capacity The judge issues orders, judgments, decrees or opinions
without unnecessary delay.
11 98–00 Administrative Capacity The judge is punctual in convening court and moves
proceedings in an appropriately expeditious manner.
Administrative Capacity The judge does an amount of work that is fair to taxpayers and
to the other judges of the same court.
02–08 Administrative Capacity The judge is punctual in convening court, keeps business
moving, and does an amount of work fair to taxpayers and
to other judges.
12 98–08 Professionalism & Temperament The judge is courteous.
Ret 98–08 Taking everything into account, would you recommend
retaining this judge on the bench?
higher than the inter-dimensional scores. A factor analysis on all twelve questions shows these
questions arrayed on a single dimension.6
Respondent attorneys generally give very high scores to judges. The response breakdown by
question is presented in Figure 1. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of a combined score for
each question, as well as by category. These combined scores were calculated by weighting the
aggregate response totals such that a judge with 100 percent “more than adequate” responses
6Principal factors method yields a single factor with an Eigenvalue of 10.570, N = 311, Likelihood Ratio test =
8137.79, p = .000. All twelve questions load onto this factor with factor loadings greater than 0.85.
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IMPLICIT BIAS IN JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS 11
TABLE 2
Inter-dimensional Correlation Matrix
Integrity Communication Professionalism Administrative
Legal Ability & Impartiality Skills & Temperament Capacity
Legal Ability 1.000
Integrity & Impartiality 0.938 1.000
Communication Skills 0.934 0.962 1.000
Professionalism & Temperament 0.885 0.909 0.892 1.000
Administrative Capacity 0.860 0.797 0.844 0.684 1.000
Note. Average inter-item covariance = 0.059, α = 0.968
would score a 1.0 and a judge with 100 percent “not adequate” responses would score a −1.0.
These distributions are presented graphically in Figure 2. The attorney responses are negatively
skewed, meaning that they tended to rate the judges quite high across all questions. However,
these data do show a significant percentage of judges rated farther than one standard deviation
above or below the mean. This indicates that the questions are able to distinguish among judges
based on some criteria.
The more important issue is determining which criteria respondents are using to distinguish
judges. The sex and race of a judge should have no relationship to that judge’s professional
performance. But previous research suggests that there are significant gender and race differences
on attorney survey measures of judicial performance (Burger 2007; Gill et al. 2011). More
appropriate covariates for judicial performance ratings would be objective measures of judicial
performance (or their proxies). For this reason, a number of control variables are included in
TABLE 3
Intra-dimensional Correlation Matrices
A. Legal Ability B. Administrative Capacity
Question 2 Question 3 Question 10 Question 11
Question 2 1.000 Question 10 1.000
Question 3 0.971 1.000 Question 11 0.971 1.000
Average inter-item covariance = 0.077, α = 0.997 Average inter-item covariance = 0.054, α = 0.969
C. Integrity & Impartiality
Question 1 Question 5 Question 6 Question 7 Question 8 Question 9
Question 1 1.000
Question 5 0.906 1.000
Question 6 0.906 0.919 1.000
Question 7 0.868 0.893 0.910 1.000
Question 8 0.882 0.893 0.935 0.916 1.000
Question 9 0.907 0.957 0.899 0.910 0.901 1.000
Note. Average inter-item covariance = 0.048, α = 0.980
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12 R. D. GILL
FIGURE 1 Attorney Rating Breakdown by Question.
the multivariate analyses.7 These variables are detailed in Table 5, and descriptive statistics are
presented in Table 6.
A series of pooled OLS regressions isolates the effects of these variables on the attorney
ratings. Table 7 presents a series of analyses using various summary indicators as dependent
variables. The models all perform quite well, but the results are disconcerting. The column labeled
“Retain” shows the effect of the various independent variables on the percentage of attorneys
who indicated that the judge should be retained. After controlling for a number of important
indicators of judicial performance, women scored nearly 12 points lower out of 100 than men;
minority judges scored 21 points lower than white judges. This pattern continues throughout the
rest of the analyses. Women and minority judges were significantly less likely to receive “more
than adequate” ratings and were significantly more likely to receive “not adequate” ratings. In
the various ABA categories, which are scaled here from −1 to +1, women and minority judges
fared worse than their male and white counterparts across the board.
Table 8 and Table 9 use as the dependent variables the percentage of attorneys rating the
judge “more than adequate” and “not adequate,” respectively, on each question. This is important
7Multicollinearity tests on the set of independent variables show no signs of problematic collinearity. No variance
inflation factor is higher than 1.82, and no tolerance is lower than 0.62.
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IMPLICIT BIAS IN JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS 13
TABLE 4
Combined Score Descriptive Statistics
Number Beyond 1
Standard
Deviation
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Below Above
Question 1 (II) 350 .33 .27 −.74 .77 33 59
Question 2 (LA) 311 .24 .28 −.79 .74 52 54
Question 3 (LA) 350 .23 .28 −.78 .76 55 63
Question 4 (CS) 350 .29 .27 −.72 .77 47 60
Question 5 (II) 350 .35 .25 −.82 .81 53 75
Question 6 (II) 350 .49 .21 −.53 .85 51 43
Question 7 (II) 350 .45 .22 −.53 .83 56 52
Question 8 (II) 350 .50 .19 −.46 .81 49 43
Question 9 (II) 350 .31 .24 −.72 .75 58 47
Question 10 (AC) 311 .39 .22 −.68 .78 42 50
Question 11 (AC) 311 .37 .25 −.79 .84 42 48
Question 12 (PT) 350 .44 .30 −.70 .92 53 47
Legal Ability 350 .24 .27 −.79 .75 54 61
Integrity & Impartiality 350 .41 .22 −.63 .79 53 52
Communication Skills 350 .29 .27 −.72 .77 53 58
Professionalism & Temperament 350 .44 .30 −.70 .92 53 47
Administrative Capacity 311 .38 .24 −.74 .81 45 45
Retention 350 75.91 14.91 8.00 97.00 56 50
because the Judging the Judges survey reports these percentages to the public. Again, the pattern
of sex and race disparity is stark. Women and minorities get significantly fewer “more than
adequate” ratings and significantly more “not adequate” ratings compared with their male and
white counterparts. Across all of these measures, judge sex and race are more significant and
higher magnitude predictors of judicial performance ratings than any of the other independent
variables.
That the remaining independent variables perform so poorly in these analyses is another
indictment of the criterion validity of the prototypical attorney survey of judicial performance.
The effects of these variables are summarized in Table 10. The most direct outside measure of
judicial behavior we have is the number of times the judge has been reversed. It seems reasonable
to expect that reversals would be strongly related to other measures of performance, especially
measures of legal ability. In fact, reversals had little impact on performance ratings. Lower reversal
numbers were significant predictors of “more than adequate” ratings on the appropriateness and
promptness of the judge’s rulings, but high reversal numbers did not increase the percentage of
“not adequate” ratings.
The proxy measures of judicial ability were also relatively weak predictors of attorney ratings.
Although previous research suggests that more experience on the bench should increase judicial
performance (Epstein et al. 2003; Haire 2001), the attorney ratings declined markedly as judicial
experience increased. The prestige of the judge’s legal education was generally associated with
higher attorney ratings. In the summary measures, higher-prestige law schools were associated
with higher ratings in the categories of integrity and impartiality and administrative capacity, but
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14 R. D. GILL
FIGURE 2 Distribution of Combined Scores by Question.
not measures of legal ability or communication skills. Judges who were initially appointed to the
bench through Nevada’s merit plan for interim appointments were indistinguishable from their
elected counterparts in the attorney ratings. State supreme court justices performed similarly to
judges on other courts.
The models also contain a variety of measures that speak to issues of professionalism, tem-
perament, integrity, and impartiality. Judges who faced disciplinary action had lower scores on
the administrative capacity questions, but there was no overall effect of disciplinary outcomes on
the integrity and impartiality score. Worse disciplinary outcomes were associated with a slight
increase in the percentage of “not adequate” ratings on race or ethnic bias and a decrease in the
“more than adequate” ratings on the administrative capacity questions.
Judges who were involved in official election disputes fared worse than other judges in almost
all of the summary categories. These disputes made the judges less likely to get “more than
adequate” ratings from attorneys, although they did not result in more “not adequate” ratings
across the board. The number of scandals reported in the media had no effect on the summary
indicators. However, judges with more scandals fared worse than other judges on two questions
dealing with impartiality and integrity. Finally, being identified publicly as a partisan had little
effect on the overall scores, although it seemed to provide some protection against “not adequate”
ratings in a couple of the performance measures.
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IMPLICIT BIAS IN JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS 15
TABLE 5
Description of Independent Variables
Female 1 if judge is female, 0 if judge is male
Minority 1 if judge is a member of a racial or ethnic minority group, 0 if judge is white
(Note: There were too few minority judges to break this category into different types of minority groups.
However, the results were robust to alternative specifications excluding various sub-groups.)
Reversals The number of times the judge has been reversed by a higher court during the evaluation period divided
by the number of cases appealed.
(Note: Alternative specifications, including raw reversals and court-standardized reversal rates yielded
similar results.)
Experience number of years the judge has spent in any judicial position at the time of the evaluation
(Note: Alternative specifications, including nonlinear specifications, yielded similar results.)
Law School The 2012 US News & World Report rankings for the judge’s law school alma mater
(1 = Top 14; 2 = 15th–50th; 3 = 51st–100; 4 = 101st-ranked schools; 5 = unranked school; 6 = did not
attend)
Appointed 1 if the judge was originally appointed via Nevada’s interim merit selection plan, 0 if the judge was
initially elected
Supreme Ct. 1 if the judge was serving on the Nevada Supreme Court during the evaluation period, 0 if the judge was
serving on some other court.
Discipline The most severe outcome of disciplinary action from the Commission on Judicial Discipline against the
judge during the review period.
(0 = no complaint filed; 1 = complaint dismissed; 2 = required course; 3 = required course and public
apology; 4 = public reprimand; 5 = public reprimand and fine; 6 = censure, required course, and fine;
7 = removal from bench; 8 = removal from bench and permanently barred from holding public office)
Election 1 if the judge was involved in an election complaint in front of the Standing Committee on Judicial Ethics
and Election Practices, 0 if the judge was not involved in such a complaint.
(Note: Alternative specifications indicating whether the judge was the defendant or the accused in an
election dispute yielded similar results.)
Scandals The number of Las Vegas Review-Journal articles linking the judge to a scandal during the review period.
(Note: Alternative specifications, including weighting the number of scandal-related articles by the
number of neutral or neutral and positive stories yielded similar results.)
Partisan 1 if judge has been associated publicly with a political party, 0 if not
(Note: Alternative specifications, including whether the judge has been identified with the Republican or
Democratic parties, yielded similar results.)
TABLE 6
Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female 94 .34 .48 0 1
Minority 94 .06 .25 1 0
Reversals 94 3.92 4.56 0 20.79
Experience 94 7.87 6.70 1 27
Law School 94 2.15 1.23 0 5
Appointed 94 .40 .49 0 1
Sup. Court 94 .11 .29 0 1
Discipline 94 .54 1.72 0 8
Election 94 .09 .28 0 1
Scandals 94 .21 .41 0 1
Partisan 94 .59 .50 0 1
Note. For ease of interpretation, these descriptive statistics are collapsed by judge.
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TABLE 10
Summary of Independent Variable Effects
Female Female judges scored significantly lower than male judges across all of the possible measures. Women
judges fared particularly poorly in measures of Administrative Capacity and Legal Knowledge.
Minority Minority judges scored significantly lower than white judges across all of the possible measures.
Reversals Reversal rates had almost no impact on performance ratings. Lower reversal rates were significant
predictors of “more than adequate” ratings in one Legal Ability question and one Administrative
Capacity question.
Experience Each additional year of experience led to a significantly lower score across nearly every measure.
Law School Higher prestige law schools were associated with generally higher scores. Law school prestige increased
scores on summary measures of Integrity and Impartiality as well as Administrative Capacity, but not
on measures of Legal Ability or Communication Skills.
Appointed Judges initially selected through Nevada’s merit system for interim appointments were indistinguishable
from those initially elected to the bench.
Supreme Ct. State supreme court justices were indistinguishable from judges in other courts.
Discipline The most serious outcomes on disciplinary action were associated with lower scores on Administrative
Capacity questions, but there was no overall effect on the Integrity and Impartiality score. Worse
disciplinary outcomes were also associated with a slight increase in the number of “not adequate”
ratings on Question 6, which deals with Impartiality and Integrity.
Election Judges who were involved in election disputes fared worse than other judges in almost all of the
summary categories. These disputes made the judges less likely to get “more than adequate” ratings
from attorneys, although they did not result in more “not adequate” ratings across the board.
Scandals The number of scandals reported in the media had no effect on the summary indicators. Judges with
more scandals fared worse than other judges on Questions 5 and 9, both of which deal with
Impartiality and Integrity.
Partisan Being identified in the media as a partisan had little effect, but seemed to provide some protection
against “not adequate” ratings in a couple of the performance measures.
DISCUSSION
Unfortunately, the results presented here suggest that there is significant cause for concern about
JPE attorney surveys. The sex and race disparities in the Judging the Judges survey act as a thumb
on the scales, systematically disadvantaging groups that have been traditionally underrepresented
on the bench. There is not a single category of questions that escapes this problem; the effects of
judge sex and race are significant, large, and consistent across all of the dimensions of judicial
performance evaluated by the Judging the Judges survey.
There is reason to believe that the source of this systematic gap in scores is implicit bias.
According to implicit social cognition theory, JPE attorney surveys are prime candidates for
implicit race and gender bias. Indeed, this kind of bias flourishes in performance appraisal
instruments for gender and race stereotyped jobs. Such bias is also fed by the kind of validity
and reliability problems that are known to plague attorney surveys. While the lack of individual
respondent-level data makes a full reliability and validity analysis impossible, the patterns in the
scores derived from this JPE instrument are consistent with what we would expect to see from an
instrument with significant reliability and validity problems.
Even setting aside the large problem of sex and race bias, the other measures of judicial perfor-
mance often do not have the theoretically expected effect on measures of judicial performance.
The inter- and intra-dimensional correlation matrices suggest that the various measures do not
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20 R. D. GILL
seem to isolate the dimensions of judicial performance. That reversals are largely insignificant in
the multivariate models is worrisome. That judicial disciplinary outcomes are not strongly related
to measures of integrity and impartiality is problematic. That scores go down consistently with
increased experience on the bench is troubling.
The bad news does not end there. Despite good intentions, it is not clear that JPEs are
designed and administered in a way that guarantees fair and reliable results. Most jurisdictions
that conduct JPEs follow the American Bar Association’s “Guidelines for the Evaluation of
Judicial Performance” (American Bar Association 1985). A recent update to the ABA’s Guidelines
(American Bar Association 2005) acknowledges the potential for bias in judicial performance
evaluations. But the paper dismisses the problem out of hand on the basis of the fact that the
Guidelines recommend behavior-based evaluation questions:
An additional benefit of behavior-based evaluation instruments is that questionnaire items reduce
subjectivity in assessments of judicial performance, thus limiting the potential for gender and other
biases to influence responses. In a behavior-based evaluation instrument, items relate to judges’
actual behaviors rather than characterizations of judges’ actions as proper or improper. (American
Bar Association 2005, 14)
The performance appraisal research generally supports such a claim. But the problem lies in the
fact that the surveys as implemented in the states do not systematically reach this ideal.
The questions on the Judging the Judges survey are derived from the ABA Guidelines, and the
questions in the survey are very similar to those questions used in model attorney surveys (Elek
et al. 2012) and existing state-sponsored JPE programs across the country (Gill et al. 2011). Take,
for example, the Colorado JPE survey. Colorado’s system of judicial performance evaluation is
one of the most studied and well-funded in the nation (Brody 2008b). The Executive Director of
the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System (IAALS) says of Colorado’s
survey:
All those individuals complete survey questionnaires that focus on things such as the following: was
the judge prepared when he or she showed up on the bench; was the judge respectful of the people
in the courtroom; did the judge move the docket along efficiently; was the judge timely in his or
her rulings and were those rulings clear and understandable? In other words, the questions focus on
process, not on outcome. (Kourlis 2010, 767)
But these are exactly the same kinds of questions that we find on the Judging the Judges survey.
And many of the other characteristics of the Judging the Judges survey are also common to JPEs
in other states, including the primacy of the survey in the in the JPE process (Pelander 1998), the
survey design problems (Elek et al. 2012), and the low response rates (Brody 2000). As such,
there is good reason to believe that the very real problems identified here are being replicated
across the country.
None of this would be a problem except for the fact that the results of these judicial performance
evaluations may actually matter. As Judge Kourlis explains, surveys of voters found that “if voters
knew that we had a judicial performance evaluation system, they would use the information and
they would trust it” (Kourlis 2010, 768). She says of these voters:
They trusted the fact that the judicial performance commissioners were looking at the right data and
making good decisions; and, thus, the voters could turn to the data and those decisions to guide them.
That is what an informed vote should look like. (Kourlis 2010, 768)
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The results of this analysis do not show conclusively that the problems plaguing the Judging
the Judges survey are present to the same degree in all JPE surveys. There are some unique
characteristics of the Clark County survey that may serve to exacerbate the findings of bias. For
example, the fact that it is not an official, state-sponsored survey may cause respondent attorneys
to take the process less seriously. There may also be some characteristics of the legal culture in
Nevada influencing the results. However, the similarities between the Judging the Judges survey
and other JPE surveys are striking. Additional research is necessary to rule out the possibility
that the deficiencies in design and execution demonstrated by Elek et al. (2012) lead to the kind
of results identified in this analysis.
In short, following the ABA’s Guidelines is probably not enough to prevent serious bias
from poisoning judicial performance evaluation scores. This is a particularly poor outcome, as
it means subjecting many judges to state-sponsored evaluations that are systematically biased
against women and minorities. This analysis raises real questions about the overall validity and
reliability of the JPE survey as a measurement of judicial performance. Perhaps it is, as some
Colorado judges suspect, simply “a popularity contest” (IAALS 2006a). While some lament the
fact that many voters are unaware of the judicial performance evaluation data when they make
their decisions (Kourlis 2010; White 2009), perhaps instead we should be relieved. All of this
does not mean that the entire enterprise of evaluating judicial performance should be abandoned;
however, we must do better than this.
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